Optionbolt | Governance

The three layers and the split

Every trade touches up to three layers.

Protocol fees split across them. The core takes 50%, hardcoded, and it always accrues to the protocol (the DAO). The matcher (the exchange, or CLOB, via a builder code) takes 50%, hardcoded and uniform no matter who they are or how much volume they bring. The frontend earns a share of the matcher's 50%, set by the matcher; our own CLOB splits its 50% evenly.

Per $1.00 of protocol fees through the full DAO-owned stack: $0.50 to the core, $0.25 to our CLOB, $0.25 to the integrating frontend. Route through a third-party CLOB and frontend and the DAO still takes the core's $0.50; the third parties keep the other $0.50 to split as they choose.

The floor is 50%, the maximum is 100%. The DAO earns the core's 50% on every trade no matter whose venue or frontend is used. It reaches 100% only when a user chooses the fully DAO-owned stack. The DAO never takes a third party's cut: its own venue competes for the other 50% on the same terms as everyone else.

The three entities

Funder, builder, and governance kept apart.

No single body both writes the code and controls the money. That separation is the point.

Optionbolt Foundation

Legal steward

Issues the token grant to Labs, holds the trademark to the Optionbolt name, and oversees token issuance. Deliberately separate from the team doing the work, so the funder is not the builder.

Non-profit steward, directed over time by the DAO.

Optionbolt Labs

The development team

A service provider, not an owner. Builds the protocol, the DAO's frontend, the CLOB, the SDK, and operates the community API. Designed so it can sell its entire token position and the protocol keeps running.

Funded by a token grant. Recovers its API cost at roughly break-even. Not a profit center.

Optionbolt DAO

Token-holder governance

Eventually owns all three layers and governs the protocol parameters. Its treasury funds contributors on a multi-decade horizon.

Takes the revenue that flows through the layers it owns.

Why the terms hold

Capture is mechanically unavailable.

VC equity creates a fiduciary duty: to sustain a valuation, a VC-backed lab is eventually pressured to capture the revenue that should flow to the protocol. A token-funded service provider has no such pressure. And the hardcoded, uniform splits make capture mechanically unavailable even if the intent later changes: there is no lever that grants one party better-than-uniform terms, because the split lives in the contract, not a business-development deal.

Builder codes: uniform terms, transparent approval. A builder code is the on-chain attribution that routes the matcher's 50% to whoever brought the flow. Every code earns the same 50%, with no preferential rate for size. Access is permissioned: codes are approved by the admin, and in time the DAO. That is a real centralization point, and an honest one; it is an anti-abuse gate, not a competitive one (without it a trader could self-issue a code to rebate their own fees, which is fee theft, not building). The safeguards are that the terms behind the gate are uniform and hardcoded, approval moves to the DAO, and the process is meant to be transparent. We do not claim permissionless; we claim uniform terms, transparent approval.

What governance controls

Admin at launch, migrating to the DAO.

These parameters are admin-controlled at launch and move to timelocked DAO control over time.

TickersWhich options markets exist.
Volatility smile and floor IVThe conservative SVI smile per ticker and the floor it is held above, with a margin of error, re-baselined as volatility shifts.
Perp-backing limitsWhich strikes may be perp-backed. In-the-money options are restricted, so the risk model only ever prices the out-of-the-money smile.
Optional fee routing to insuranceWhether a share of protocol fees seeds the insurance vault.
Builder-code approvalWho may earn the matcher's share (an anti-abuse gate).
Fee-revenue useBuybacks, audits, developer grants, funding Labs' at-cost API.
Excess-premium splitnot yet liveHow an unspent bond splits between the insurance vault and the writer.

Contract-accuracy note: the core today refunds the full bond on a clean exit or an out-of-the-money expiry. The excess-premium split is a governance lever that is not yet wired into the contract.

Licensing, and why forks do not break the model

Forking is invited, not defended against.

The core stays BUSL-1.1: source-available, but not a free commercial fork, so no one can ship a no-fee clone of the fee layer. The CLOB and the frontend are open-source, so anyone can fork, rebrand, or run their own. A forked CLOB or frontend still clears through the core and still pays the same hardcoded split. If the terms were not truly uniform, forking to escape them would be worth it; because they are, a fork gains nothing by leaving, and the ecosystem gains a competitor on identical terms. The Foundation, and in time the DAO, owns the trademark to the Optionbolt name: fork the code freely, but you cannot ship it as Optionbolt. The brand is the one thing defended; the terms are the thing that does not need defending.

Decentralization and exit

What needs no one, and what is a service.

The core clears trustlessly: no operator is required for options to clear, settle, and resolve on-chain, which is why Labs can sell its entire token position and the protocol keeps running. The CLOB is permissionless, and code is law on the fill: orders are EIP-712 signed and stored off-chain on a relay Labs runs, but matching and settlement happen on-chain against those signed orders, so you never trust the operator to fill you at the right price. The operator is a liveness dependency (it can censor, delay, or go down), not a safety one (it cannot misprice or steal), and even that has an exit: the relay is open-source and forkable, and you can always clear through the core directly and keep the matcher's 50%. The API, relay, and frontend are conveniences, not dependencies: open-source, forkable, and fundable by the DAO if Labs steps back.

Points

A points program, stated plainly.

Non-transferableNo claim conferredEmissions TBDNo token promised

A points system runs initially, with the emissions schedule to be decided. Points are non-transferable and confer no claim, and any future token is not promised here. Any value-accrual mechanism the DAO may later direct is a governance decision, not a commitment.

Build on it

Uniform terms, open layers, DAO ownership.

See the three ways to plug in and keep your share, or follow along as the structure is finalized.

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